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This article argues for a view on languaging as inherently affective. Informed by
recent ecological tendencies within cognitive science and distributed language studies a
distinction between first order languaging (language as whole-body sense making) and
second order language (language as system like constraints) is put forward. Contrary
to common assumptions within linguistics and communication studies separating
language-as-a-system from language use (resulting in separations between language
vs. body-language and verbal vs. non-verbal communication etc.) the first/second order
distinction sees language as emanating from behavior making it possible to view emotion
and affect as integral parts languaging behavior. Likewise, emotion and affect are studied,
not as inner mental states, but as processes of organism-environment interactions.
Based on video recordings of interaction between (1) children with special needs, and (2)
couple in therapy and the therapist patterns of reciprocal influences between interactants
are examined. Through analyzes of affective stance and patterns of inter-affectivity it is
exemplified how language and emotion should not be seen as separate phenomena
combined in language use, but rather as completely intertwined phenomena in languaging
behavior constrained by second order patterns.
Keywords: first order languaging, second order language, affective stance, ecological naturalization, inter-
affectivity, emotion, sense making
INTRODUCTION
Emotion and language belong together. Indeed, in this article it
will be argued that emotion in fact lies at the heart of language
if viewed as an embodied dialogical activity. Still, within main-
stream linguistics as well as in communication studies, language
and emotion have so far been categorized as belonging to two
separate domains that must be kept apart: Language, on the one
hand, belongs to the structures of thought comprising an abstract
“language system”; it is based on words and representations and it
is communicatively deliberate, while emotion, on the other hand,
belongs to the body; it is associated with un-intentional reactions,
sensations and actions visible in a non-abstract and separate
“body language.” This article, however, aims to show the inade-
quateness, and ultimately false nature, of these dichotomies while
pointing to a new way of looking at the relationship between lan-
guage, emotion, action, and intersubjectivity. It is about time to
put an end to unfruitful divorce between language and emotion.
They need to be brought back together.
FIRST ORDER LANGUAGING AND SECOND ORDER LANGUAGE
New developments in language studies have now made it
possible to investigate emotion as an integral part of our lan-
guage activity rather than studying emotion as a somehow
separate phenomenon added to speaking. The recent theoret-
ical developments carving the way for such a proposal have
taken place within a variety of new approaches to language,
cognition and social interaction such as distributed language
and cognition (Thibault, 2008, 2011; Kravchenko, 2009; Cowley,
2011a; Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 2011; Pedersen, 2012; Steffensen,
2012; Cowley and Vallée-Tourangeau, 2013; Jensen, 2014),
dynamical systems and interpersonal coordination (Bickhard, 2007;
Fusaroli et al., 2013b; Fowler, 2014), dialogism (Linell, 2005,
2009), ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979; Hodges, 2009, 2011),
and embodied and enacted cognition (Chemero, 2011; De Jaegher
and Di Paolo, 2007; Anderson et al., 2012; Di Paolo et al.,
2013).
The key notion in the present work is the term languaging. It
originally stems from the early works of Maturana (1970) and
has recently been revived and redeveloped by a number of schol-
ars working within the distributed language group (Love, 2004;
Linell, 2009; Cowley, 2011a; Pedersen, 2012; Steffensen, 2012).
In particular the term has been elaborated in various works by
Thibault (2005, 2008, 2011), and it is this particular version of
the notion of languaging that will be adopted in this article1. In his
2011 article Thibault argues that the recent developments within
distributed language studies represent:
..a renewed attempt to better understand the materially embod-
ied, culturally/ecologically embedded, naturalistically grounded,
1Hence, when referring to languaging as behavior or whole-body sense
making it is in the Thibault version of the term. For an overview of the var-
ious positions to languaging and the first and second order distinction, see
Steffensen (2014).
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affect-based, dialogically coordinated, and socially enacted nature
of languaging as a form of whole-body behavior or whole-body
sense making (p. 211).
This view attempts to capture the activity bound character of lan-
guage as its primordial feature. Languaging involves a complex
coordination of multiple activities emphasizing the dynamics of
real-time behavioral events that are co-constructed by co-acting
agents. For that reason languaging—language as an activity—is
promoted as a first-order phenomenon, whereas what is usually
referred to as language within linguistics—language as a symbolic
and rule-governed system—is seen as a second-order construct or
constraint on languaging behavior. The term “language” therefore
becomes an umbrella term encompassing both first and second
order as two different but intimately related dimensions in this
specific kind of behavior.
Importantly, this approach entails an inversion of the tradi-
tional ontological order of language saying that firstly we have
a “language system” which is then turned into use by “lan-
guage users.” This is rejected arguing that first of all there is
activity, and out of this languaging activity “grows,” on longer
evolutionary as well as socio-cultural timescales, language as a
symbolic system-like constraint that highly influences languag-
ing behavior. This shift is crucial because it re-conceptualizes
our general understanding of “language.” Traditionally, within
folk understandings as well as within linguistics, we look upon
and comprehend language as a combination of system and use
(with the system as the primary ontological phenomenon and
the use as an epi-phenomenon). From a distributed perspective
however, we can see language as an activity system; that is com-
prised of first order activity and second order constraint. i.e.,
“we depend on dynamics first and symbols afterwards” (Cowley,
2011a, p. 11). In that sense the term “language use” implies a
pre-established system whereas languaging designates activity or
behavior as the primary ontological feature of language while also
acknowledging the socio-cultural constraints making this activity
something distinct—or different from other types of activity or
behavior.
This article is chiefly an examination of the affective and emo-
tional dimension of languaging dynamics of face-to-face interac-
tion (i.e., speaking, hearing, gazing, gesturing, mimicry, postural
sway, and so forth) while also considering how these types of
activity are constrained by second order patterns2. The theoret-
ical claims put forward in this work are developed on the basis of
thorough analyses of empirical data consisting of video recordings
of different situations and subsequent transcription that allow
for detailed investigation of the inter-bodily dynamics of human
dialog.
2The specific focus on emotion in situ, in the observable here and now of
social interaction, entails that what is often referred to as “autobiographi-
cal” emotional experience (Damasio, 2003), that is, emotional memories and
knowledge about the past, will, for the most part, play a less prominent role
in the following. Whereas what is commonly called “procedural” emotional
experience (Tulving, 1984), or emotional episodes (Colombetti, 2014), that is,
momentarily emotional experiences and action embodied in person’s behav-
ior, play a much more prominent role in the analyses as well as the theoretical
chapters.
EMOTION AS PART OF LANGUAGING
Within the growing literature on distributed language and cog-
nition (Thibault, 2008, 2011; Kravchenko, 2009; Cowley, 2011a;
Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 2011; Pedersen, 2012; Steffensen, 2012) the
close relationship between emotion and languaging has often
been implied (e.g., languaging as “affect-based” in the Thibault
quote above). Still, a more thorough attempt to investigate the
intricate connections between emotion and languaging remains
to be seen. This article is a first step in this direction by relat-
ing and specifying the languaging approach in terms of emo-
tions in social interaction. It will be argued that emotion is not
separated from language—as an independent non-verbal com-
ponent to verbal communication as it is often laid out—nor
can emotion be regarded as merely a secondary function of lan-
guage. Instead emotion and affect are integral parts of languaging
behavior3, or rather languaging is whole body activity including
emotion.
On a fundamental level we feel in conjuncture to the move-
ments of ourselves as well as other people: We see, hear and
experience other people’s emotions in and through their whole-
body movements (facial, gestural, postural, and vocal) and like-
wise we enact emotions by altering our voices, moving our bodies,
using our facial muscles, making gestures, or touching each other
(Colombetti, 2014). Thus, emotions and emotional experiences
are inherently tied to bodily sensations. Indeed it is virtually
impossible to imagine an emotion without a bodily sensation as
famously argued in relation to fear by William James:
What kind of emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings nei-
ther of quickened heart-beats nor of shallow berating, neither of
trembling lips nor weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of
visceral stirrings, were present, is quite impossible to think (James,
1884, pp. 193–194).
Furthermore, a fundamental quality of emotions is their “ability”
to ascribe value to experiences. Through emotions we experi-
ence something as “something”—fearful, exciting, boring, scary,
attractive, or repulsive. As several neuro-scientific studies of peo-
ple with brain damage have shown, without emotion the world
appears “gray” and uniform with no appeal to act upon it
(Damasio, 1996). Within such studies emotions are examined in
relation to the human brain “as complex collections of chemical
neural responses forming a distinctive pattern” (Damasio, 2003,
p. 53). In short emotions can be seen as complex neural, chemical,
and behavioral patterns functioning as feedbacks on encounters
or situations processes by which our bodies assess their state and
make adjustments to maintain their homeostasis. Thus, in this
sense, which is the position taken in this article, emotions are in
3Some scholars distinguish between affect (or mood), as a more primary and
pervasive phenomenon, and emotion, as more experientially specific and dis-
tinct (see for instance Colombetti, 2014, pp. 2–15). However, for the sake of
simplicity and space this discussion will not be pursued in the present work.
Thus the terms “emotion” and “affect” are used more or less interchangeably
also reflecting the various uses within linguistics and psychology respectively.
“Affect” is a more common term in linguistics whereas “emotion” is more
widespread in the social sciences and psychology. For this reason both terms
are used here but with “emotion” as the most prevalent one.
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fact movements; not just within us however, but also movements
that connect experiences with situational affordances:
Emotions are processes of organism-environment interactions.
They involve perceptions and assessments of situations in the con-
nected process of transforming those situations. The body states
connected with feelings are states of both response and remaking
of experience. I say, “I’m fearful,” but this really means “The situa-
tion is fearful”; fearfulness might appropriately be described as an
objective aspect of the situation for me at this moment. (..) In short,
emotions are both in us and in the world at the same time. They
are, in fact, one of the most pervasive ways that we are continually
in touch with our environment (Johnson, 2007, p. 66).
However, in order to relate these processes directly to language
a re-specification of our conception of language is called for.
And this is what the notion of languaging offers: As part of
our languaging behavior, parts of our whole-body sense making,
emotions are enacted as evaluative processes, intersubjective posi-
tions, and possibilities for action4. In that sense emotions are part
of a human-environment system. They are part of our ecology as
properties of whole situations, including individuals and environ-
mental structures. To sum up, given that emotions are seen, not as
individual inner states, but as processes of organism-environment
interactions, and given that languaging is seen, not as an abstract
semiotic system, but as dynamic adaptive behavior, emotion is
to be seen as an intrinsic part of languaging itself. Indeed, it is
impossible to fully understand languaging as behavior without
considering emotion.
STRUCTURE OF THE ARTICLE
Overall the article can be divided into five major parts:
Following this introduction, there is a critical examination of
the way emotion has been addressed by separating it from lan-
guage within linguistics and communication studies (section
Traditional Obstacles in Integrating Language and Emotion).
This is followed by a more elaborate treatment of a combined
dialogical/ecological approach to language and cognition with a
specific focus on an how emotion can be seen as part of lan-
guaging (section Languaging). Section Analyses is the empirical
part, consisting of analyses of video recordings of real life social
interactions investigating the claims put forward in the previous
section. Finally, in section 5 the analytical findings and theoretical
claims will be put in perspective in relation to the study of emo-
tion and cognition and the methodological challenges of this new
approach will be discussed.
TRADITIONAL OBSTACLES IN INTEGRATING LANGUAGE
AND EMOTION
Why is it then that the phenomenon we call language is
commonly understood as something separate from emotion? Or
4An alternative to view emotion and affect as inherently evaluative can be
found in recent enactive approaches to emotion: “From the enactive stand-
point defended here, bodily arousal is not merely a response to the subject’s
evaluation of the situation in which he or she is embedded. It is rather the
whole situated organism that subsumes the subject’s capacity to make sense of
his or her world” (Colombetti, 2010, p. 157).
rather, what is it in our understanding of the notion of “language”
thatmakes it separate from that of emotion? An attempt to answer
these huge questions, while staying within the space limitations of
this article, has to operate with a strict focus. Let us therefore limit
our focus to four widespread views on language and communica-
tion that indirectly have come to function as obstacles for a more
integrated view on emotion and language: (1) A view on language
as a code-like system. (2) A conception of language as a phe-
nomenon first and foremost based on words resulting in distinc-
tions between language vs. body language, and verbal vs. nonverbal
communication. (3) A view on language and communication as a
transfer of information from a sender to a receiver. (4) A view on
language as a social phenomenon through and through that can be
treated without any consideration of its biological dimensions.
Let us now take a closer look at these obstacles.
OBSTACLE 1: LANGUAGE AS A CODE-LIKE SYSTEM
Twentieth century linguistics was dominated by powerful
form-based theories of abstractions like structuralism and gen-
erative grammar that ended up excluding the dynamics of real
time language behavior as a relevant study of object (Harris, 1987;
Linell, 2009). As it has often been noted in the history of lin-
guistics (Lyons, 1981) the two major components in Saussurean
linguistics: langue and parole, share many similarities with the
Chomskyan notions of competence and performance, in the sense
that the proper object of study became “language” as a hidden
set of structured forms underlying the various kinds of language
use. The language system is conceived as either an autonomous
system (langue) or a specific module in the brain (competence).
In both cases the key is that the language faculty is separate and
must be studied in its own right apart from the messy dialectics
of real-time speech production and comprehension. As a conse-
quence the focus on an idealized system of linguistic knowledge
left no room for the role of emotion or affect; emotion was cate-
gorized as a phenomenon that by definition is excluded from (the
study of) language.
Looking back, these abstract theories of language have been
heavily criticized for losing sight of the way language is actually
used and for completely neglecting the role of the context
(Levinson, 1983; Chafe, 1994). As a consequence, since their hey-
day a wide variety of usage based approaches to language have
appeared. There is, however, still a massively prevalent tendency
to think of language in terms of system and use respectively5 ;
the premise being that if studying language you can choose to
focus on one or the other, but the fundamental division in sys-
tem and use is—almost—unquestionable. The problem however
in accepting this division, even for usage based theories, is that the
underlying assumption is that the system is the foundation (or the
essence) while the use is a changeable epiphenomenon. The theo-
retical consequence is that emotion can never be part of language
itself; it can only be added as an extra non-linguistic device in
language use.
5See for instance this introductory line presenting the study of pragmatics:
“Those aspects of language use that are crucial to an understanding of lan-
guage as a system, and especially to an understanding of meaning, are the
acknowledged concern of linguistic pragmatics” (Levinson, 1983, Back cover).
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OBSTACLE 2: LANGUAGE AS FIRST AND FOREMOST BASED ON
WORDS
In his, 2005 book Per Linell describes a written language bias
concerning a strong tendency in linguistics to describe and
understand spoken language in the terms of written language—
resulting in a fatal lack of awareness of the distinct characteristics
of spoken language. It has resulted in the common assumptions
that writing and speaking are only different external manifesta-
tions of the same underlying “language” (langue, competence,
conceptual system, etc.) and thus that writing and speaking basi-
cally share the same task of expressing human thought—albeit
in different ways. A further consequence has been a reification
of language. Language is seen as a phenomenon that by defini-
tion is based on words (or other lexical items), and subsequently
sentences and grammar, as in written language6. That is, words
or other lexical items, function as designators of fixed and well-
defined meanings (except when deployed in metaphorical or
indirect ways). Words are treated as separate entities that func-
tion as representations of meaning. As a consequence there is a
separation between what is intrinsic to the meaning of words and
what is somehow seen as being outside this confined linguistic
meaning.
This view lives on in the popular and widespread (common
sense) distinctions between language vs. body language or ver-
bal vs. non-verbal communication. The former are based on
words, the latter on something else (bodily practices) than words.
Body language or non-verbal communication is by definition
something separate from language concerning unintentional sen-
sations or feelings that contain an “unspokenmeaning”7. Whereas
body language is exclusively defined as behavior, not language
(Boyes, 2005), the concept paralanguage is defined as meta-
communication more directly related to language (Poyatos, 1993;
Van Berkum et al., 2008). Still, it relies on a distinction of the
linguistic content in itself (what is said) as separate from the vari-
ety of ways, typically involving prosody, pitch, volume, intonation
etc., in which something is said or communicated (how it is said)
(Thibault, 2008).
The theoretical consequence is again that the numerous, and
affective laden, ways in which words are deployed (negotiated,
interpreted, explored enriched, etc.) in the meaning dynamics of
actual talk becomes detached from “language itself.” Therefore,
emotion and affect is treated as something that can only mod-
ify, emphasize or nuance meaning by its virtue of not being
language.
6The claim is that with the invention of writing the notion of language under-
went a process of reification and objectification due to the permanent and
visible signs on paper. The conception of language was transformed from an
embodied activity into an object (of study). The view on language as a struc-
tured set of abstract forms used to represent things in the world evolves from
this written dimension and its embodied dialogical nature is backgrounded or
treated as irrelevant (Linell, 2005).
7This is mostly true of communication studies whereas as other fields, such
as gesture studies, to a much larger degree see verbal utterances and ges-
ture as one communicative whole and therefore gesture as a part of language
(Kendon, 2004). Still, surprisingly only recently have gesture (arm and hand
movements) been directly related to emotion and affect. More about this in
section Languaging, primary intersubjectivity, and language.
OBSTACLE 3: COMMUNICATION AS TRANSFER OF INFORMATION
The classical idea within communication studies is still that
communication can be captured as a transfer of information
between individuals (Weaver and Shannon, 1963). This notion
rests on the idea that something is communicated and further-
more that this “content” is of a somewhat stable character.
This idea has been analyzed in terms of the conduit metaphor
in which language is viewed as a “conduit” conveying men-
tal content between people (Reddy, 1979). It is metaphorically
construed as if, whenever people communicate, they “insert”
their mental contents (meanings, thoughts, concepts, etc.) into
“containers” (words, phrases, sentences, etc.) whose contents are
then “extracted” by listeners. Again it is worth noticing that this
conceptualization rests on the highly problematic notion that
meanings of utterances as somehow internal and distinct from
their unfolding or deployment8.
Interestingly there is a strong parallel to the way emotions,
or rather emotional expressions and emotional communication,
have been studied. The most obvious example is the way in which
the human face has often been described as a sort of “mirror”
of our emotional states. Thus, facial expressions are widely con-
sidered the most reliable source for studying emotions dating all
the way back to Charles Darwin’s seminal work The Expression
of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1998/1872). More recently
the psychologist Paul Ekman has conducted several studies on
the alleged universal correspondence between basic emotions and
specific facial expressions (Ekman, 2006, 2007)9. However, this
type of research in facial expressions rests heavily on a Cartesian
division between the inner emotional state and the outer emo-
tional expression: Emotions are hidden inside us and sometimes
our facial expressions reveal this “inner landscape.” Thereby the
expressive or communicative part becomes only an outer byprod-
uct of the inner source—the emotions themselves. Furthermore,
there is a tendency to view emotions as revealing as well as
“real.” They can be trusted (unlike language) exactly because they
are “involuntary not intentional” (Ekman, afterword in Darwin,
1998/1872, p. 372)10. They disclose our inner motives and desires
8It is of course important to mention that the information transfer model has
been heavily criticized for exactly this and is now abandoned by many posi-
tions within the social sciences. The more up to date alternative is a view on
meaning in interpersonal communication as a co-constructed sense-making
that is accomplished within the interaction itself (Jensen, 2014).
9Today there is to large extent an agreement within emotion researchers on
the validity on cross cultural facial expressions and their correspondence to
basic emotions. At least when it comes to the universality of distinguishing
between negative emotions such as happiness, sadness, fear, anxiety on the
one hand and positive emotions as surprise and joy on the other hand. It is for
instance generally acknowledged that it is a universal phenomenon that eyes
widen with surprise and joy and narrow with anger. Still, it has proven more
difficult to distinguish within different negative emotional expressions—such
as sadness, anger, fear, and disgust—than between positive emotions such as
joy and happiness (Planalp, 1998).
10Evidently, this problem also concerns the distinction between verbal and
nonverbal communication: “A long standing debate concerning verbal and
nonverbal communication has been whether verbal communication can be
trusted at all in terms of its ‘truthfulness.’ In almost any introductory text-
book to nonverbal communication, students learn that words may lie, and
nonverbal signals do not” (Sandlund, 2004, p. 84).
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and thereby send an unintentional “message”: “We don’t make
an emotional expression to send a deliberate message, although a
message is received” (ibid: 373).
For this reason this approach has also been criticized and re-
thought within communication studies:
The fact that people can and do alter the expressions of even the
primary emotions suggest that emotion display or emotion expres-
sion may be more aptly termed emotional communication, in the
sense that emotional information, like other types of information,
is shaped for audiences. (..) Emotions may (or may not be) be acti-
vated internal states, but when they are communicated, they are
packaged in ways that are consistent with other communication
practices (Metts and Planalp, 2003, pp. 348–49).
Still, even though the authors attempt to free themselves from
the dualistic tension in the term “emotional expression” they
get caught up in the communication transfer model. Emotional
communication is still understood and conceptualized in terms
of a sender and a receiver. Indeed, the whole argument gov-
erning the division of emotional communication into different
“channels” or “cues” (physiological, bodily, vocal, and facial cues)
is flawed by its own terminology. Thus, the sheer notion of
emotional cues still entails a view on emotions as an encap-
sulated entity originating within the individual and then being
brought into public light through different devices. Emotions are
described as “information” which is then “shaped for audiences”
when being communicated—exactly like the linguistic mean-
ing is described within communication models. To sum up, the
notion of emotional communication is only possible by means of
dualistic separations of “inner emotional states” from the outer
social communication of those states, and likewise a separation
of the specific “emotional cues” (body language) from the “real
language.”
OBSTACLE 4: LANGUAGE AS A PURELY SOCIAL PHENOMENON
This last obstacle reflects a tendency which is present in varying
degrees within different contemporary language studies, such as
linguistic anthropology (Wilce, 2009) discourse analysis, discursive
psychology (Potter, 1996) and the so-called third wave sociolin-
guistics (Eckert and Rickford, 2002), to postulate that most, if
not all, aspects of reality are constituted, embedded, and main-
tained in and through language. What we call “reality” is socially
negotiated and linguistically constituted which means that we do
not have access to any kind of reality outside of our linguistically
determined experience. This view rests on the assumption that
language does not represent a given reality “out there” but rather
constitutes our experience of reality.
The basic idea that language is first and foremost a practice and
cultural resource which gains its meaning, not from representing
thoughts or ideas, but from what it does in contextually defined
situations, actually does have many points in common with a
distributed “languaging approach.” Still, this purely social, or
constructionist, view often comes with an unfortunate tendency
to reject natural or biological phenomena as having a meaning
outside of conceptual treatments. Put a bit crudely, it implies
that language defines the scope of our experience and therefore
we only have access to “natural” phenomena in and through our
language use. Or rather, they only gain meaning by being con-
ceptualized through language. This creates a focus on language
ideologies (Bauman and Briggs, 2003), among them how emotions
are conceptualized in our language use. Despite the relevance and
interesting findings of such studies there is a tendency to reduce
emotion to a matter of words or ways of talking:
Discursive psychology, for example, examines emotion vocabular-
ies and refers to emotion discourse as a “way of talking.” “Instead
of asking the question, ‘What is anger?’,” Harré writes, “we would
do well by asking, How is the word ‘anger’ actually used in this or
that cultural milieu and type of episode?” (Maynard and Fresse,
2012, p. 93)
The premise of such studies lies in the constructionist assumption
that our access to emotion is mediated and constituted by our
language use. Emotions are only “emotions” when called “anger,”
“joy,” “embarrassment,” and so forth. Thus, emotions become
intellectualized as a matter of words and concepts and the result
is that there is no independent (emotional) reality outside of
language. Instead of widening, or redefining, the notion of lan-
guage, as inherent in the notion of languaging, language becomes
detached from its embodied characteristics and emotion is locked
in the confined room of emotion words. Likewise, bodily actions
and movements are in many constructionist analyses (Harré,
1986; Gergen, 2009) treated as first and foremost a by-product
of verbal discourse and social conventions which, in the end,
results in a social reductionism that leaves the embodied biological
dimensions of emotions fundamentally unexplained.
Now, from the vantage point of this article it is vital to avoid all
of these obstacles separating emotion from language and instead
strive toward an ecological naturalization that sees language “as
fully integrated with human existence” (Cowley, 2011a, blurb),
implying, among other things, that emotion and affect can be
embraced as integral parts of languaging behavior. Let us now
have a closer look at such an approach.
LANGUAGING
AN ECOLOGICAL NATURALIZATION
First of all it is important to clarify that an ecological
naturalization (Steffensen and Cowley, 2010; Thibault, 2011;
Steffensen, 2014) is by no means an attempt to reduce culture,
sociality and language to biology, neurology or physics as implied
in some previous attempts on naturalization (Pinker, 2003). On
the contrary an ecological naturalization goes against any sharp
distinction between the socio-cultural and the natural sphere. In
relation to the present work, the key ambition is to present a study
of how emotions can be analyzed in situ without committing to
either a biological or a social standpoint that respectively excludes
the other. Instead, inherent in the notion of languaging proposed
here is the tenet that language, at the same time, is a cultural
organization of processes and naturalistically grounded in human
biology implying that:
..there is no inherent contradiction between seeing language as
biogenic and as social, simply because sociality is our human
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way of being nature. This assumption both precludes the bio-
reductionism that ignores supra-individual (i.e., social or cultural)
dynamics and the socio-reductionism that ignores the metabolic
and ecological foundations of human existence (Steffensen, 2014).
Secondly, this ecological viewpoint crucially affects the
re-thinking of the notion of language, conceptualized as
first order dynamics and second order patterns, as mentioned in
the introduction. Real time adaptive flexible behavior and coor-
dinated activity is referred to as first-order languaging (putting
weight on the fact that language arises from activity); this activity
however presents itself (on a phenomenological level) as words
and utterances with meanings and connotations and so forth,
i.e., as second order language. Contrary to a representational
view on language however, it is crucial to bear in mind that
“speaking does not refer to the world; it causes an experience that
happens to coincide or not with the narrow situation or the larger
reality such as it is enacted” (Bottineau, 2010, p. 278). Thus, the
meaningful patterns and configurations of speaking arise because
we, as bio-social beings enmeshed in specific social realities,
are accustomed to take, what Stephen Cowley has coined, a
language stance (Cowley, 2011b). We learn to scrutinize and
discriminate between different sounds (and movements) so that
we hear vocalizations as words in the process of being enrolled
in an ecological reality. In a complex bio-social environment,
bodies, physical artifacts, words, embodied movements (gestures,
gazes, mimicry, postural sway, etc.), social norms, and other
sociocultural resources all function as enabling conditions or
affordances (Gibson, 1979; Hodges, 2009) for human action.
Thus, put a bit crudely, the focus shifts from abstract forms (as in
traditional linguistics) to a reconsideration of how “we perceive
bodily events as wordings. Emphasis on coordination allows due
weight to be given to the fact that languaging predates literacy
by tens-of-thousands of years. By hypothesis, all linguistic skills
derive from face-to-face activity or languaging” (Neumann and
Cowley, 2013, p. 18).
This ecological approach does not need to mark a sharp
line or discrimination between (what is usually called) a natu-
ral or social/cultural reality. Instead the distinctions or dualisms
between the biological vs. the social and the here-and-now vs. the
grand scale formations are challenged by grounding languaging
in bodily co-experience while at the same time being sensitive to
overreaching cultural and social constraints on language.
LANGUAGING, PRIMARY INTERSUBJECTIVITY, AND LANGUAGE
As laid out by Paul Thibault the recent movements within
distributed language studies positions languaging as intimately
related to intersubjectivity and affective attunement:
“Human language is seen more and more as a suite of flexible and
adaptive behaviors that are based upon a naturalistically grounded
intersubjective sensitivity to the bodily dynamics (movement) of
others and the sensorimotor coupling relations between persons
and their worlds that result from this in the intersubjectivematrix”
(Thibault, 2011, p. 212).
In the same vein, in a recent publication within embodied
and social cognition, Joel Kruger refers to an older study of
breastfeeding (Kaye, 1982): “the infant’s earliest and most com-
plex form of social interaction. The rhythmic cycles and back-
and-forth interplay of breastfeeding appears to play an important
role in the infant’s social cognitive development. . . Within the
dynamics of this exchange, mothers sculpt the infant’s attention:
their behavior is organized by the mother’s touch and physical
prompting. The infant is guided to notice salient environmen-
tal affordances by the jiggling (e.g., the nipple affording feeding)
that, in light of her underdeveloped endogenous attention and
lack of behavioral organization she might not otherwise pick up”
(Krueger, 2013, p. 43).
It seems obvious that the contours of languaging, in its most
basic form, are definitely grounded in such early intersubjective
behaviors. Of course, later in the course of life it expands and
gains an enormous complexity by being enmeshed in the socio-
cultural reality, as described in the previous section. Thus, what
is referred to in the present work as “languaging” overlaps, to
some extent, with what other scholars, primarily concerned with
bodily behaviors only (Gallagher, 2005; De Jaegher and Di Paolo,
2007; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008), call primary intersubjectivity
(Trevarthen, 1979). However, in this work “languaging” is put for-
ward since the specific research interest and focus is different. It
is a focus on showing the continuity between bodily engagements
and activities including speaking and verbal behaviors—and thus
second order. That is, bodily activity in the here-and-now which
is always already being constrained by situation transcendent
elements emanating from larger socio-cultural timescales. The
commonly learned second-order language shows up in the flow of
first-order languaging, shaping and constraining the possibilities
for sense-making therein, though not exhaustively determining
or explaining them. In that sense languaging behavior is infused
with second order patterns; thus the first/second order distinc-
tion is not a clear cut separation like the traditional distinction
between system and use.
Furthermore, there is a tendency within both primary
intersubjectivity approaches (Trevarthen, 1979; Gallagher and
Zahavi, 2008; Krueger, 2013) as well as embodied and extended
approaches to cognition (Clark, 2008; Chemero, 2011) to under-
thematize language, and thereby not attempt to explain how lan-
guage more specifically relates to our bodily engagements. Many
scholars who seem quite progressive in relation to cognition, per-
ception, emotion etc. still maintain a somewhat traditional view
on language as “a tool for thinking” (in traditional views) or (in
more modern versions, see Clark, 2008) a way of extending our
minds into the world, and thereby neglecting the activity bound
character of language (see Steffensen, 2009; Fusaroli et al., 2013a;
for a similar critique). Whereas the languaging approach allow
us to see language as first and foremost an activity; it “is a doing”
(Cuffari, 2014, present volume) intimately tied to affective attune-
ment while also being constrained by second order patterns.
AFFECTIVE STANCE AND INTER-AFFECTIVITY
In opposition to traditional dualistic conceptions of emotion as
“inner states” and behavior as “outer conduct” there is a long
and rich phenomenological tradition of dealing with perception,
action and emotion as intertwined phenomena by, among others,
Maurice Merlau-Ponty:
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 720 | 6
Jensen Emotion in languaging
I do not see anger as a psychic fact hidden behind the gesture (..)
The gesture does not make me think of anger, it is anger itself.
I perceive the grief or the anger of the other in his conduct, in
the face or his hands, without recourse to any inner experience
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964/1992, pp. 48–49).
The important point, made already more than half a century ago,
is that we do not, as commonly thought, infer inner emotional
states on the basis of (an interpretation of) outer behavior; rather
we perceive emotions directly in our interlocutors. Emotions
come about as behavioral patterns, or put another way, they are
in the behavior, not a product of or something to be drawn out of
the behavior. Relating this to languaging and human interaction
and emotion we can say that, in interaction, we perceive emotions
directly in order to do things. Gestures, facial displays, posture,
wordings, or simply whole-body languaging acts, generate affor-
dances for trajectories of further action in human dialog (Hodges,
2009). Interaction is constantly pushed forward by actions that
invite or afford further actions by; here emotions play a cru-
cial role as the “grease” keeping these dynamics going. In that
sense human dialog is often, in varying degrees, infused with,
what Karl Bühler called “communicative valence” (kommunika-
tive Valens—Bühler, 1934, p. 31. Taken from Caffi and Janney,
1994):
During interaction, we tend to perceive others as “opening up”
or “closing down,” being responsive or reticent, making signs
of approach or withdrawal; we perceive their relative strength
or weakness, their fuller or lesser presence, their attentiveness
or disinterest. All such perceptions are rooted in, and depend
on, emotive displays. (..) It is the capacity, for example, to view
“positive” behavior as a possible starting point for agreement or
cooperativeness, “negative” behavior as a possible starting point
for disagreement or conflict. (..) In all cases, the interpretation
of emotive activities involves an appreciation of interpersonal
relations and self-presentation (Caffi and Janney, 1994, p. 329).
This aspect of human interaction is often described in terms of
stance taking (Du Bois, 2007; Goodwin, 2007; Goodwin et al.,
2012). According to John Du Bois, when we express opinions,
and/or display affect, three dimensions are at stake simultane-
ously; evaluating the topic we are talking about, positioning our-
selves with respect to topic and others, and aligning or dis-aligning
with our interlocutors. There is, however, a quite narrow focus on
words and a somewhat individualistic point of view in (parts of)
the stance literature11; consider for instance these lines from Du
Bois’ The stance triangle: “One of the most important things we
do with words is take stance(..) Stance can be approached as a
linguistically articulated form of social action” (Du Bois, 2007, p.
139). From the vantage point of this article it is crucial to widen
the scope of stance so as to investigate affective stance as part
of (whole-body) languaging behavior and intertwined with the
dynamics of human-environment-systems. Stance is the perfect
example of languaging as whole-body sense making; processes
of evaluating, positioning and/or aligning/dis-aligning are by no
11See Goodwin et al. (2012) for a more broad approach to stance including
bodily behavior as well.
means restricted to “the use of words” (even though they often
play a part) but involve whole bodies engaging in adaptive flexible
behavior.
Affective stance is crucial in understanding languaging as
attunement to the environment in and through coordination of
behavior (Bickhard, 2007; Fusaroli et al., 2013b). Languaging is
about coordinating dynamics; it is “something we do together”
(Fusaroli et al., 2013a, p. 2). Taking this perspective a step further,
in a recent article on gesture in interaction Böhme and colleagues
investigate how we do affective coordination together, coined as
inter-affectivity.
Affect in face-to-face communication is assumed to manifest itself
as embodied inter-affectivity. Our analyses will document that
affect is in fact a dynamic and shared “in-between” phenomenon,
jointly created by the participating interlocutors. Therefore, an
interactive expressive movement unit is a sequentially organized
product of joint gestural activities of co-participants in an inter-
action, which, by definition, entails more than one gesture unit
(Böhme et al., 2014, p. 2116—italics in original).
This notion of inter-affectivity, challenging the idea of affect
and emotion as properties of individuals, in turn makes it pos-
sible to question the traditional clear cut distinctions between
Self and Other as two separate entities that can only com-
municate be means of “emotional cues” or “channels.” Rather,
human interaction can be seen as an unfolding of a “temporar-
ily coordinated functional whole, consisting of two sub-systems
(Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 2011). A consequence of this is that the unit
of analysis shifts from the interpretation of individual doings and
the causal link between separate actions to a more systemic view
considering human interaction as a dialogical system (Steffensen,
2012) which can be seen as “systems of co-present human beings
engaged in interactivity that bring forth situated behavioral coor-
dination (or a communicative, structural coupling) (Steffensen,
2012, p. 513). Such behavioral coordination is infused with affec-
tive valence and emotion from the very outset. Adaptive flexible
behavior is all about adjusting, attuning, directing, opposing
or contrasting behavior within a human-environment-system,
or human-human-environment-system. Or put in another way,
emotions can be seen as the glue of dialogical systems.
ANALYSES
METHOD AND TRANSCRIPTION
Central to the notion of languaging, as previously described, is
the inclusion of embodied actions of all sorts: posture, gaze, ges-
ture, facial movements, voice quality, in- and out-breaths, etc.,
are all important parts of first order languaging. This of course
needs to be reflected in the methodological praxis in general,
and specifically for this work, in the transcribing and notation of
interactional data.
However, there can be no such thing as all-encompassing
transcription; for instance the notation of facial movements and
gesture in the present work is by no means as detailed as studies
focusing solely on these phenomena, for example by using close
ups on each participants face and hands. In this case, only one
camera for each recording was used. Still, as mentioned earlier
the primary research questions for this work concern languaging
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behavior in its totality, not the specific role of facial movements or
gesture as such. A basic model of the transcription system devel-
oped by the conversation analyst Jefferson (2004) is employed
here which include notations of basic prosodic features, such as
pitch, volume, speed, intonation, and tone of voice (i.e., smiley
or crying voice). In many conversation-analytic studies the verbal
and vocal activities are supplemented with comment lines of
descriptions of embodied activities. Still, a serious challenge
for developing a specific methodology for analyzing languaging
in situ is the traditional outset in words and individual talking
turns inherent in both the notion of speech acts as well as (to
some degree) in conversation analysis (Searle, 1969; Hutchby
and Woofit, 1998). As noted by, amongst others, Per Linell and
Sarah Bro Pedersen a word and line based transcription (with
bodily movements only appearing as comments) can in itself be
seen as proof of a written language bias (Linell, 2005; Pedersen,
2012). Furthermore, to some extent this procedure (involuntary)
reflects a tradition in linguistics that endows words and verbal
behavior with a certain privileged status. Nevertheless, since we
cannot go back in time and be present in the flow of interaction
as it took place, we need to be able to capture and represent what
went on. For the sake of recognizability this often means reading
a word based transcription perhaps combined with notations of
bodily movements.
Another way to go about it however is to combine words
based transcriptions with images. Images have the advantage of
favoring an in situ impression of the interaction instead of a ret-
rospective description; they show the dynamics instead of trying
to explain them. For these reasons the verbal transcriptions are
combined with images paving the way for an analysis of these
conversations as instances of whole-body languaging behavior.
The verbal utterances are presented in the Danish original first
and then translated into English in the following line (in ital-
ics). A complete overview of the transcription symbols is attached
as an appendix to the article. Still, it needs to be said that there
is a tension between the notion of languaging as whole-body
sense making and this CA inspired model of transcription that
is in need for clarification and further development in future
works12.
ANALYSIS: AFFECTIVE STANCE IN LANGUAGING
The following example is taken from a larger recording from a
Danish school for children with special needs13. M and E, a pair
of twins diagnosed with intellectual disabilities, and a speech and
language therapist are sitting around a table playing a card game.
It is a board game with different cards depicting various objects,
animals and social situations and the objective is to train the
verbal skills and social knowledge of the children. Leading up to
the sequence belowM has drawn a card and is now supposed to
say what it depicts.
12For other ways of capturing and transcribing languaging behavior see
Steffensen (2012), Pedersen and Steffensen (in press), and Böhme et al. (2014).
13This recording was made available to me by professor, Gitte Rasmussen, on
condition that the anonymity of all the persons involved was upheld. I would
like to express my deepest gratitude to Gitte Rasmussen for the opportunity
to work on these data.
Parcipants: S: Speech and language therapist; M and E.    
1 S:  hva ﬁk du der↑  
 what did you get there↑ 
2: (2:0)  
3 S:  hva er det for noget 
  what’s that 
4 M:  RRCH RRCH  
5  S:  ☺JA HVA HEDDER DEN↑☺ >hva hedder 
 den↑< (0:2) en: (.) gris men det er faksk et 
 vildsvin 
     ☺YES WHAT IS IT CALLed↑☺ >what is it 
 called↑< (0:2)   a: (.) pig but it’s actually a wild 
 boar 
In the middle of the sequence something unexpected happens:
instead of delivering a verbal answer to the two questions posed
by S (in line 1 and 3)M suddenly performs a variety of (bodily)
languaging actions (see second picture). Up till that point M has
been sitting still while holding out the card with his right hand for
both him and the other participants to see (see first picture). But
all of a sudden the intensity changes in the inter-bodily dynamics
between M and S. A series of affective movements start unfolding
beginning in line 4 with M becoming highly energetic: throw-
ing his torso back and forth, kicking under the table, smiling and
moving his head while at the same time with high volume utter-
ing two distinct sounds (RRCH RRCH) resembling the sound
of pigs. Immediately the activity level of S changes as well. In
the first half of line 5 her eyes widen significantly while gazing
directly at M; she smiles and starts speaking with a distinct smiley
voice with high volume, emphasis and rising intonation (see third
picture). Together these rapidly evolving and tightly coordinated
inter-bodily dynamics of M and S build an affective alignment.
An alignment that emerges from the totality of the inter-actions,
not just as a result of separate individual actions, but as an overall
pattern or configuration of expressive movements (Böhme et al.,
2014), vocal sounds and wordings that emerges as shared inter-
affective experiences of intense involvement, joy, and excitement.
As depicted by the yellow circle in the last picture both M and S
are complete engaged in their inter-affective movement dynamics
(gesturing, moving their upper bodies, smiling, grimacing, and
gazing at each other) that, taken together, build a shared affective
encapsulated by the yellow circle. Thus, the yellow circles means
to depict the affective development from M’s (individual) ges-
ture and whole-body movements to the inter-affective coupling
between S and M in the last picture14.
Furthermore, it is crucial to pay attention to the sequential
placement of M’s initial languaging actions. They are embed-
ded in the ongoing structure of the interaction and performed in
line 4 at exactly the point in which a traditional verbal answer
would be expected. But instead of stating verbally what is on
the cardM is acting the depicted content by uttering pig-like
14At the same time however, for a brief moment, this structural-emotional-
coupling isolates E as not being part of this alignment, which is apparent in
the way he looks down at his own cards disengaging from the shared activities
between S and M.
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sounds, kicking under the table and throwing his torso back and
forth. It can be seen as a whole-body languaging act of show-
ing instead of telling. Indeed, these whole-body movements are
an instance of affective stance taking embedded in the immediate
environment and arising from ongoing processes of interaction.
As described previously, stance is traditionally understood and
described within the framework of words. In this case how-
ever, by letting whole-body actions replace wordingsM takes a
stance that immediately affords an alignment by S. In acting the
answer instead of just saying itM indirectly evaluates the object
as well, i.e., the predefined task at hand and the way the answer is
meant to be delivered. Thus, this whole-body languaging behav-
ior redefines the rules in a creative way and thereby positionsM
in relation to the game activities, which in turn enacts an inter-
affective space betweenM and S that aligns their stance taking and
enhances an immediate intersubjective understanding between
them.
First order languaging constrained by second order language
Focusing on the second half of the response of S however,
reveals the short lived character of this intersubjective alignment:
S’s confirming response in the beginning of line 5 is quickly
repeated only this time without any of the initial prosodic fea-
tures such as smiley voice, high volume and rising intonation:YES WHAT IS IT CALLed↑ (.) >what is it called↑<), i.e.,
this repetition works more as a more straightforward request
for a verbal answer. In other words, the first-order whole body
stance taking is quickly constrained by a verbalized (second
order) request. The here-and-now languaging behavior becomes
enmeshed in the prerogative—or the second order constraint—
of the socio-cultural function of the game: To train the ver-
bal skills of the children. The initial acknowledgement of S
had a function: it cooperated in establishing an intersubjec-
tive alignment. Then, there were renewed possibilities; room
for trying things that are hard and difficult, namely verbal
depiction, which is the aim of the game and possible as S is
willing to redefine the rules to achieve the goal. For a brief
moment S had acknowledged that whole-body languaging is
indeed language, meaningful and even powerful. At the same
time however, verbal language is needed in this social learning
activity, as well as in society in general, to accomplish certain
tasks.
In relation to this example the consequence is that an embod-
ied emotional languaging response needs to be enrolled in sec-
ond order norms and patterns in order to gain recognition and
acknowledgement, i.e., it needs to be verbalized. Thus, in the last
part of line 5, after a mini pause of 0.2 s, S provides this requested
verbal answer herself. She “takes a language stance” and thereby
transforms the bodily actions ofM into a recognizable verbal pat-
tern naming and categorizing the action ofM as depicting “a: (.)
pig but it’s actually a wild boar.”
Summary
This example explicated how:
- An increase in the intensity of inter-bodily dynamics formed a
space of inter-affectivity, within which whole-body languaging
actions replaced a verbal answer functioning as interactional
affective stance taking.
- The affective stance taking involved evaluation, positioning and
alignment even without the use of words. The properties of
stance, normally investigated in verbal language, functioned as
an integral part of this languaging behavior.
- Likewise the affective dimension was from the beginning built
into these languaging actions, not added to them as an extra
nonverbal component. Thus, what is often described as “para-
linguistic aspects” such as prosody, facial or upper body move-
ments, are to be seen as part and parcel of first order languaging.
- The whole body affective languaging behavior was constrained
by second order language and norms in the responses of the
speech and language therapist pointing to socio-cultural func-
tion of the game.
In the next example we will investigate further how affect and
emotion are built into languaging behavior in the phenomenon
of laughing while also being constrained by second order.
ANALYSIS: THE ECOLOGY OF LAUGHTER
Laughter in interaction is an intriguing phenomenon in relation
to emotion and affect. It is tempting, and therefore common, to
consider laughter as a spontaneous and individual phenomenon;
a force of nature that sometimes get the better of us resulting in
individual single outbursts of laughter. On the other hand, laugh-
ter is commonly experienced as contagious. It rapidly spreads
among interlocutors15, and in this regard it can be seen as a shared
phenomenon that evolves in the intersubjective space between
people. Furthermore, in a number of studies the conversation
analyst Gail Jefferson has shown how laughter in interaction can
be regarded as an activity that invites participation: “speaker him-
self indicates that laughter is appropriate, by himself laughing, and
recipient thereupon laughs” (Jefferson, 1979, p. 80—italics in orig-
inal). Thus, an interlocutor invites others to participate by the
act of laughing itself, and furthermore, if the interlocutor does
not join the laughing, or only laughs momentarily, the laugh-
ter of first-speaker lasts significantly shorter (Jefferson, 1984).
In this sense, laughing in interaction is by definition something
we do together, and for that reason solo-laughter is not com-
mon, nor acceptable, for too long in social interaction. This can
remind us that there is much more to laughing than sponta-
neous and individual outbursts; on a fundamental level laughing
is grounded in an ecology of inter-affectivity. It is integrated
into the languaging behavior and profoundly tied to the bio-
social interworld (Linell, 2009) of perceptions, bodily actions and
social attitudes of interlocutors and embedded in interactional
structures.
This longer sequence comes from a larger set of recordings
of couple’s therapy sessions featuring a therapist and married
15For instance, the emotional contagion approach explicates how emotional
reactions such as laughter rapidly spread in groups of both mammals and
humans. It is a process consisting of three steps—mimicry, feedback, and
contagion—enabling people “from moment-to-moment to catch others’
emotions” (Hatfield et al., 1993, p. 99).
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couples16. As an introductory exercise this couple is asked to
mention one thing about the other that they appreciate and
value. This request however, is followed by a considerable pause
of 3 s in line 1, which is subsequently broken by the starting
laughter-and-talking. Apparently, the silence following what per-
haps ought to be an easy task for a married couple creates a con-
trast that provokes laughter even though it also might appear as
problematic17 :
Laughing as a gestalt of shared expressive experience
In this sequence the laughing emerges gradually from initial out-
breaths and “laugh particles” interpolated within wordings in line
1 over the increase in volume, stress and smiley voice in line 2
to the eruption and flow of a full-fledged laughter in line 3– 7
(see second picture) until it suddenly stops in the overlaps of line
7 and 8 (see third picture). It lasts almost 8 s and has a clear
trajectory. The distinct in- and outbreaths evolve in a rhythmi-
cal pattern that is completely intertwined with the inter-bodily
dynamics of speaking, tone of voice, gesturing, postural sway,
facial displays, gazing at each other or into the room, closing
one’s eyes and even tactility (gathering hands and touching one’s
face).
In line 1 the pause is suddenly disrupted byM moving his
shoulders up and down in small rhythmical movements while
making hearable outbreaths surrounding and interwoven in the
articulation of “no(h)w.” These actions are immediately reflected
by a change in W’s behavior from sitting still and looking into
the distance to a distinct smiling-and-gazing-behavior directed
toward M. In a flash, through the movements they share emo-
tions building inter-affectivity. It is the totality of their “inter-
active expressive bodily behavior” that taken together appear
as “one gestalt of shared affective experience” (Böhme et al.,
16The recordings were undertaken in relation to my Ph.d. dissertation in 2008
in collaboration with the Danish Imago Center.
17As investigated by Gail Jefferson laughter in interaction sometimes has the
social effect of dealing with sensitive topics. It can be seen as a way ofmanaging
troubles-talk “exhibiting that, although there is this trouble, it is not getting
the better of him [the speaker]; he is managing; he is in good spirits and in a
position to take the trouble lightly (Jefferson, 1984:, p. 351). Something similar
seems to be the case here. By engaging in laughing behavior the couple mutu-
ally deals with the fact that they were not, on the spot, capable of recalling
something valuable about each other.
2014, p. 2116). Thus, the initiation of this “laughing behav-
ior” is built into the whole-body sense making inseparable
from first order languaging behavior. Furthermore, the end-
ing of this gestalt unit of laughing in line 6–7 comes about
within a similar tight coordination of actions. SuddenlyM and
W inter-bodily affective dynamics are replaced by a quiet posi-
tion of sitting still with their heads bowed and hands in their
laps (third picture). In order to understand this sudden change
we need to look at the behavior of the therapist. In the end
of line 5 T starts changing her posture (see small yellow cir-
cle in second picture); she gathers her arms behind her back
and then, just after M’s speaking turn in line 6 (whileM and
W are still engaged in their laughing behavior) T closes her
eyes and lets her head fall onto her chest. It is an action by
which T visibly withdraws from the ongoing laughing behavior
while displaying concentration and introversion as opposed to the
extroverted mutual laughing exhibited byM and W. It is strik-
ing how this silent, yet overt, bodily demonstration achieves a
change in the dialogical system that ultimately stops the ongoing
laughing.
Laughing brings forth a “sharedness” by engaging people
which is exactly the reason it is also highly sensitive to actions
of disengagement. This is illustrated by the impact of the silent
withdrawal of the therapist form the laughing activity; it brings
the laughter to an end pointing to the fact that laughing itself
requests participation in order to be sustained within a dialog-
ical system. Like other languaging acts laughter is profoundly
other-oriented; it requires a response in the form of more laugh-
ter to be maintained. Thus, what this analysis points to is
that laughing is not only tightly bound to the inter-affective
sharing and exploration of joy and amusement; it is also inte-
grated in the overall languaging behavior and therefore it can
easily be restructured and “toned down” by other languaging
acts.
Employment of second order patterns in laughing
Looking closer at the trajectory of the laughter reveals two signif-
icant “peaks” of laughing in terms of volume, intensity, duration
and postural sway in line 3–4 (overlapping) as well as line 6–
7 (also partial overlapping). Common for these peaks is their
sequential placement right after verbal and gestural actions; i.e.,
they seem to function as multimodal responses to what have just
been said (and done by means of gesture) suggesting that these
actions are not only built into the very structure of laughing, but
even contributes significantly to its development. Now let us take
a closer look at these actions.
In line 2W makes a very distinct gesture-and-posture (see
first picture) exactly at the point when M says PAUSE FOR
REFELCTI::ON:thereby providing a visual feedback and image
reflecting the wordings. Likewise, in line 6 a similar (albeit not
identical) gesture-and-posture is performed by M simultane-
ously with his own speech on an amazi(h)ng PRESSURE. We
can call these repeated gesture-and-postures, an emblematic
thinking-gesture-and-posture. They have the characteristics of
placing the right hand or fingers either on one’s cheek (first
instance—see picture) or in front of the mouth (second instance)
while wrinkling brows and looking downwards (somewhat like
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the famous “The thinker” sculpture by Auguste Rodin). These
gestural actions arise from and are integrated into the whole
gestalt unit of laughing in which they have a complementary
function to the ongoing speech. Both of them complement the
meaning of the verbal actions of having to think hard whilst
under pressure; i.e., they provide an image of “concentration”
that in turn can be mutually elaborated adding to the sharing of
affective experiences, and thus again contributes to the humorous
effect which can be witnessed by the subsequent increase in
laughter following them.
Thus, we can see how the first order activities of shared laugh-
ing are constrained and enriched by second order patterns. The
utterances themselves are at the same time first order embod-
ied actions (smiley voice, high volume, laugh particles within the
wordings, postural sway, etc.) and second order manifestations
of affording a view from the outside—e.g., “here we are, a cou-
ple in therapy without even being able to (immediately) come up
with something nice to say about each other.” It illustrates how
languaging activity can be seen as multi-scalar, since it involves
a coupling with other timescales transcending the here-and-now
of situational activities. This dimension concern the second order
patterns that originate from larger scale dynamics of interacting
agents on larger (and longer) socio-cultural time scales. In dia-
logical terms it enacts “other voices” (Linell, 2009), i.e., in human
interaction we do not just interact with each other, but also with
an array of third parties emanating from cultural traditions, soci-
etal norms and so forth. As famously pointed out by Bakhtin:
“The word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes one’s
“own” only when the speaker populates it with his own intentions,
his own accent, when he appropriates the word” (Bakhtin, 1982,
p. 294). Thus, sense-making and meaning in interaction can-
not be reduced to individual activity; it is, at once, inter-bodily,
interactional, situated, and situation transcendent, and in that
sense fundamentally co-authored (Linell, 2009; Steffensen, 2012,
see also Cuffari, 2014, this volume):
Sense making re-enacts multiple voices, defined as silent oth-
ers that affect what we think, say, do and not do in situated
dialogue. Sense-making, thus, unfolds as double dialogicality that
links socio-cultural history (norms, knowledge, rules etc.) with
real-time dynamics as we orient toward each other and use cul-
tural artefacts (including verbal patterns) (Pedersen and Linell,
in press).
The verbal and gestural actions in line 2 and 6 “comment”
on the situation by evoking a position viewing and evaluating
this specific couple therapy interaction in the here-and-now
from a larger “outside.” The wordings, gesture and posture
invite such an outside view of socio-cultural norms that cre-
ates a doubleness (Jensen and Cuffari, 2014) that actually seems
to furnish and elaborate on the humorous effect. The second
order view from the outside may add to a feeling of absur-
dity, which, in this case, makes the situation even funnier—and
in paradoxical way contributes to the inter-affective shared-
ness of laughing together. In this way, having a closer look
at the trajectory of the laughter illustrates how “laughing”
is a rich and complex affective phenomenon deriving from
first order activities while being constrained by second order
patterns.
Summary
To sum up, the affective quality of laughter as an integral part of
languaging can be summarized in the following way:
- Laughter occurs as a whole-body phenomenon involving not
only in- and outbreaths, but posture, facial movements, ges-
ture, intonation, volume of speech. and tactility as well.
- Laughter is intertwined with wordings while also being deeply
embedded in the inter-bodily dynamics working as a whole
behavioral gestalt unit of inter-affectivity in which affect and
emotion must be understood as constituting parts.
- Laughter is tightly coordinated with various communicative
motives as part of a whole-body sense making which places
laughter as an integral part of languaging behavior.
- Laughter as an activity can be tightly constrained second order
socio-cultural patterns which can enrich and elaborate on the
laughing activity.
FINAL REMARKS
This article offers a re-specification of the traditional distinction
between “language system” and “language use” as first order lan-
guaging and second order language. It is re-conceptualization that
in turn offers an opportunity to see affect and emotion as part and
parcel of languaging behavior while also being constrained by sec-
ond order language. In that sense emotion and affect need not be
separated from language; emotion and affect need not be treated
as “non-linguistic elements” that are added to language. Instead
languaging behavior is promoted as inherently affective and at the
same time enmeshed in second order patterns. An obvious advan-
tage of such an approach is that language can be studied as part
of human action as such which again allows us to see aspects of
that action, hitherto separated from language, such as affect and
emotion, as part and parcel of language as it evolves from human
life (Cowley, 2011a; Steffensen, 2014); not just as an “instrument”
that we use for “communication.” This entails that language is not
first and foremost seen as a system, it is not just about words, and
it is not conceived of as a channel that transfers information; nor
is language understood as merely a social phenomenon devoid
of a biological dimension. On the contrary it is grounded in a
naturalistic approach to language that sees language as evolved
from and completely intertwined with the complexity of human
behavior.
However, this approach to language also raises serious con-
ceptual and methodological challenges. One of them being: if
language is re-specified as whole-body sense making, or behavior,
how can we, as researchers interested in language, specify, delimit
and measure our object of study? Or put simply, where does lan-
guaging begin and where does it end? In a recent review article
Sune V. Steffensen discusses this problem arguing that Thibault’s
broad definition of languaging is indeed too broad:
While first order linguistic interaction and coordination is indeed
a whole-bodied achievement, the definition may seem too broad,
as it can be read as suggesting that each and any “whole-bodied
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achievement” is an instance of first-order languaging. But describ-
ing my boiling an egg or preparing an omelette as first-order
languaging intuitively seems to stretch the term. On the other
hand, Thibault’s definition would be applicable if wordings played
a part in recalling my mother’s instructions of how to make an
omelette, or if I elicit my family’s preferences for hard-boiled or
soft-boiled eggs (Steffensen, 2014).
It is true that preparing an omelet does not intuitively seem to
be part of languaging. We need to be able to able to discriminate
between languaging behavior and other types of behavior. As sug-
gested in the introduction one way to define languaging behavior
more precisely is to see it as coordinated actions constrained by
second order patterns. Such an approach is also implied in the
quote above by suggestion the inclusion of wordings in recalling
a recipe as a possible way of viewing cooking as an instance of
languaging.
Still, such a tentative definition does not solve all the prob-
lems in conceptualizing languaging as whole body behavior or
sense making. First of all, it does not sufficiently address the ques-
tion of intentionality and meaning. Many types of behavior are
carried out without any intention of influencing the behavior or
experiences of others, but for practical purposes: We make an
omelet or prepare dinner for our family in order to get some-
thing to eat; not because we want to “convey a message” (even
though that might sometimes be the case). Clearly, such an activ-
ity would not count as languaging behavior; on the other hand
we might imagine a very distinct way of preparing a meal, a
clattering of the crockery and cutlery, i.e., a hectic, hasty, and
perhaps even angry way of cooking that (granted the presence
of others) may indeed be orchestrated in a way such as to cause
“an experience that happens to coincide with the narrow situ-
ation or the larger reality such as it is enacted, and has to be
mapped against the environmental medium, including the psy-
chological environment” (Bottineau, 2010, p. 278). Even if such
a behavior is performed without the use of words it might still
be (partial) communicative deliberate by its virtue of doing, act-
ing and manipulating the environment in certain ways which
transcends the mere practical purposes. Furthermore, “making
an omelet” or “preparing a meal for a family dinner” are prac-
tices that are only possible within a specific ecological niche with
certain historic-social-cultural horizons of significance, i.e., it is
by no means detached from second order patterns. Likewise,
cooking activities often require a certain culture-specific train-
ing; they often have a social character and perhaps even an
emotional significance for the people involved. Does it count as
first order languaging behavior then? There is no easy answer to
this, and many further studies need to be performed in order
to investigate further how languaging are enmeshed in human
practices.
This article presents an ecological approach to language and
emotion. One of the implications of such a point of departure
is that the distinctions between what is considered biological
vs. social are fundamentally challenged. Is preparing a meal a
social or biological act? Or for that matter engaging in learning
activities with a speech and language therapist or participat-
ing in couple therapy with your spouse? From the direction
of this work, posing these questions makes little, if any, sense.
This article argues for a reconsideration of the unreflective rift
between the biological (individual) and the social (collective).
Mainstream linguistics and cognitive science generally take biol-
ogy as first and foremost an individual phenomenon, while
sociality is understood as something purely collective and pub-
lic. Correspondingly, emotion and cognition are construed as
individual, internal, and private processes, while communica-
tion conversely is conceived as purely social, public, and outer.
The problem arises when these distinctions come off as mutually
exclusive. On a dichotomous reading, what is social is understood
as that which by definition does not belong to nature or biology
and the other way round (Cuffari and Jensen, 2014). However,
the notion of ecology rests on a principal bio-social founda-
tion; unlike the more familiar, and wholly social, concept of
context:
The ecology is not an outer frame that just surrounds or con-
tains the individual agents and it cannot be captured in the
simple outer-inner dichotomy. Rather, the ecology emerges from
the active sense-making of agents employing the physical materi-
als and socio-cultural resources of the environment (Cuffari and
Jensen, 2014).
In the same vein, we need to transcend the dichotomy between
viewing emotions as either a primarily biological or social phe-
nomena. Emotions are at the same time rooted in neurological
structures and embodied sensations, subjectively felt experi-
ences, socially embedded and integrated with action and lan-
guaging. In that sense, emotions are part and parcel of our
ecology in the manner of which they are intertwined with
our languaging behavior in the animal(human)-environment
system. Embodied emotional actions are enacted in languag-
ing as affordance to locate and orient us to the possibilities
that we encounter. In that sense, emotions help us to build
an interpersonal “geography” for us to share, participate in or
confront.
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